Forfeiture by wrongdoing – Another method the state uses to violate your right to confront witnesses against you. Also, how many times does your attorney have to actually meet you before the state can put you to death following trial?

While doing some research the other day for a current case, I read the most recent Ohio Supreme Court case on the ages-old doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing and boy did it have some, shall we say, interesting “takes” by our esteemed elected justices.  I’ll start with the basics:  every criminal defendant is entitled to confront the witnesses against him at trial.  In other words, if someone provides testimony at your criminal trial, you have the absolute right to cross examine that person.  This is an inviolate right under the 6th Amendment.  Did I say inviolate?  What I should say is that like all constitutional rights, when it gets too much in the way of convictions, courts are going to chip away at it until it barely resembles what the founders envisioned.  Seem harsh?  Well, judges don’t get elected for being soft on crime. Moreover, who would ever believe that the police got the wrong guy?

Anyway, one way to get around the right to confront the witnesses against you is under the common doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  Under this doctrine, a defendant does not get to cross examine an unavailable witness at trial if that witness’ unavailability is due to the wrongdoing of the defendant.  The classic example is that of a witness who provided out of court hearsay statements to the police, is subsequently threatened by the defendant, and refuses to testify at the trial for fear of reprisal.  In this instance, the state can introduce the hearsay statements from the “unavailable witness,” and the defendant has no means to test the veracity of the statements through the crucible of cross examination.  The theory is that the defendant forfeited his right to confront the witness when he made him or her unavailable through his wrongdoing (i.e. threats).

On its face, this seems fair.  How can you complain that the person is not there to cross examine when it was you that made them unavailable?  The problem, as evidenced by State v.  Mckelton, 148 Ohio St. 3d 261 (2016), is that courts will stretch to make the doctrine applicable.  In McKelton, the defendant was accused of killing his girlfriend (and former defense attorney – same person), and the state convinced the trial judge that her previous out of court statements to nieces, social workers and others regarding the defendant’s violent behavior towards her should be allowed to come at his capital trial because he made her unavailable to testify by killing her.  No, this was not a dying declaration, which is another exception to the hearsay rule.  Rather, the trial court believed that by having killed her, she is now unavailable and her out of court statements are fair game under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.  Put the cart before the horse much?  Well, the Supreme Court rightly rejected that reasoning, as would any fifth grader struggling to understand basic logic.

So all is good in evidence land?  Not so much.  The Supremes went on to invoke the doctrine for an entirely different reason and ultimately allowed the statements to come in anyway.  According to our high court, the history of domestic violence between the two, along with the defendant’s propensity to try to prohibit the victim from reporting the abuse to authorities, means that he forfeited his right to confront the victim at trial.  Of course, one cannot confront a dead person absent the use of a medium.  So the proper decision would have been to exclude her statements. But that did not happen here.  The money quote in the decision is as follows: “Thus, although Allen (the victim) had not formally contacted police, her nieces testimony indicates that Mckelton was trying to isolate Allen and prevent her from talking to authorities.”  But not about her murder, or any other pending criminal case.  And this is where the court’s analysis fails.

Strangely, the Court seems aware that U.S. Supreme Court precedent “makes clear that the exception will not apply ‘in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the victim’ when the defendant has ’caused a person to be absent’ but did not do[] so to prevent the person from testifying.”   Moreover, the court describes the test for proving this doctrine as requiring (1) the defendant engaged in wrongdoing that caused the witness to be unavailable and (2) one purpose for the wrongdoing was to make the witness unavailable to testify.  None of this was proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

The defendant did not kill the victim in order to prevent her from testifying in any case at any time, period.  He killed her because he was a bad guy and liked to beat up women. Simply put, the test for invocation of the forfeiture by wrongdoing was not met and the supreme court goofed this one.  Had there been a pending DV case and she was killed to prevent her testimony, we have a different result.  However, the court essentially claimed here that “well, you know, he tried to prevent her from reporting domestic violence to the police previously, so we find that he more likely than not killed her to prevent her from testifying” …. at some imaginary proceeding that the justices believed was surely going to come about one day.  This is wrong, wrong, wrong.

And although the court cites other cases in which courts have found that a pattern of domestic violence is relevant to the purpose prong of the forfeiture doctrine analysis, they do not explain with any more clarity just what testimony Mckelton was seeking to prevent, as is the law.  Of course a history of DV would be relevant in determining whether a particular victim is afraid to testify at a trial.  But how can DV be relevant when the victim was never going to testify at any proceeding.  There was no pending case for her to testify at.

Unfortunately, the complete butchering of logic is not the only thing we see in McKelton.  We also learn that your capital defense attorneys need only meet with you twice in order to be considered effective.  They also need not hire a mitigation expert even though the court allocated money to do so.  It is undisputed that Mckelton’s two trial attorneys only met his twice … ever!  We don’t know how long those meetings were, but two seems pretty insufficient to prepare for a death penalty case.  In the end a majority of the court shrugs this off and finds no ineffectiveness of counsel.   The Court doesn’t say that two is the minimum, so perhaps one is okay?  Maybe zero would be alright as long as the attorney shows up for trial and is wearing a suit.  I wonder if the test shouldn’t be whether your attorney can pick you out of a lineup.  My guess after reading Mckelton is that if the underlying facts of the homicide were bad enough, the court wouldn’t make that a requirement.  They might still require you to wear a suit, however.

Reading Mckelton is all types of sadness.  The man comes across as a cold-blooded killer and he probably was.  You feel sorry for those that encountered him. As I was not his attorney, I can say that.  But also saddening is the high court’s complete lack of understanding that stretching the rules to ensure this particular bad guy gets a date with the gurney causes problems for other defendants down the line.  Perhaps some of them will actually be innocent.  Police do make mistakes.  And to sign off on a death sentence where his attorneys unsuccessfully tried to withdraw from the case only to be “forced” to continue to represent him, only met with his two times in preparation of his death trial, and failed to even hire a mitigation expert, is pretty cold-blooded too.



Failing to call an expert witness in criminal child maltreatment cases may be ‘ineffective assistance of counsel’

By Daniel Pollack

The United States Constitutiodpollackn’s Sixth Amendment  states “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” The phrase that most of us probably cite most often is the last one, “the assistance of counsel.” There are many aspects to demonstrating that an attorney has lived up to a reasonable standard of competence.  The Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), has held that the Sixth Amendment does not just guarantee a right to counsel – it guarantees a right to effective counsel. And, the Supreme Court has interpreted this right as extending to all “critical” stages of a criminal proceeding.

For a number of different reasons, ineffective assistance of counsel can be a factor in an alleged wrongful conviction. Examples may be include an attorney’s failure to call a witness, properly investigate the facts of the case, cross-examine a witness, request DNA testing, make objections to a prosecutor’s arguments, acknowledge a conflict of interest, or present an expert witness on behalf of the defendant. This article briefly investigates the last circumstance.

In the child welfare legal arena this issue may come up in child maltreatment cases. For instance, in People of the State of Michigan v. Ackley (2015), Leo Ackley was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder and first-degree child abuse following the death of his live-in girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter while in his care. At his trial, the prosecution called five medical experts. They testified that the child had died as the result of a head injury that was caused intentionally. Ackley’s attorney called no experts even though court funding for expert assistance was available and a forensic pathologist might have corroborated the possibility that the girl’s injuries resulted from an accidental fall. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that that “defense counsel’s failure to engage a single expert witness to rebut the prosecution’s expert testimony, or to attempt to consult an expert with the scientific training to support the defendant’s theory of the case, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and created a reasonable probability that this error affected the outcome of the defendant’s trial.”

Indeed, “[c]riminal cases will arise where the only reasonable and available defense strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert evidence.” Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. at 1088 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011)). When is an attorney’s decision not to retain an expert witness a matter of reasonable trial strategy and tactics, and when is it evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, resulting in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice? In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to retain an expert witness, an appellate court must evaluate and determine whether the attorney’s decision was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in similar criminal cases. The reviewing court should avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight” and “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90). As the United States Supreme Court has said, sometimes “a single, serious error may support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 383 (1986).

dpollackDaniel Pollack is a professor at Yeshiva University’s School of Social Work in New York City and a frequent expert witness in child welfare cases, including child abuse, neglect and dependency cases. Dan is a frequent guest contributor to the Ohio Family Law Blog since 2009. He can be reached at  or at 212 960-0836.

This article, “Failing to call an expert witness in criminal child maltreatment cases may be ‘ineffective assistance of counsel’” originally appeared in Policy & Practice, June 2017, 25 & 34.

When A Longer Sentence Does Not Equate To A Presumption Of Vindictiveness

Back in June 2016, I wrote a blog entitled, Courtroom Taxes For Utilizing The Jury Box:  A Look At Courts Taxing Defendants With Prison For Exercising Their Constitutional Rights.  Well, almost a year later, the issue of trial tax came up again in State v. Rahab, 2017-Ohio-1401.  This time around though, the Ohio Supremes had their chance to weigh in on the subject of Vindictiveness as it relates to trial tax.

In Rahab, Rahab was charged and indicted for burglary.  Prior to his jury trial, the state offered Rahab a plea deal.  The plea deal required Rahab to plead guilty as charged in exchange for a three year agreed sentence.  Rahab rejected this offer in open court and on the record.  After a jury trial, the jury found Rahab guilty of burglary.  The trial court sentenced Rahab to six years in prison.  Rahab appealed his sentence arguing that his sentence was contrary to law because the trial court had punished him for exercising his right to a jury trial rather than accepting the plea offer.

The First District Court of Appeals rejected Rahab’s argument and found that the trial court had based its sentence on the facts of the case and the defendant’s prior history rather than on his decision to go to trial.  Rahab appealed to the Ohio State Supreme Court which granted Rahab’s discretionary appeal.

To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357.  A sentence vindictively imposed on a defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial is contrary to law.  State v. O’Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140.

Well that is all good, but how the hell does Rahab prove vindictiveness?

Rahab argued that the court’s statements during sentencing gave rise to an inference that it sentenced him vindictively and that the inference could be rebutted only by an unequivocal statement as to whether the decision to go to trial was or was not considered in fashioning the sentence.  State v. Scalf, 126 Ohio App.3d 614.

In other words, Rahab argued that the court should presume vindictiveness based on the trial court’s statements.

This presumption of vindictiveness comes from North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711.  In Pearce, Pearce successfully appealed his original trial and was granted a retrial.  After the retrial, Pearce was again found guilty.  This time around though, Pearce received a harsher sentence.  The court held that a presumption of vindictiveness arose when the judge imposed a more sever sentence after the second trial.  Id.  The presumption could be rebutted by affirmative, non-vindictive reasons for the sentence on the record.  Id.  According to the Pearce court, due process requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.  Id.

In every effort to not bore you than already accomplished, the Ohio Supremes explained through a series of United States Supreme Court cases on why Rahab’s argument of the presumption of vindictiveness fails.  The Ohio Supremes stated that they shall reverse Rahab’s sentence only if they clearly and convincingly find the sentence is contrary to law because it was imposed as a result of actual vindictiveness on the part of the trial court.  With that logic, the Ohio Supremes held that Rahab had to prove actual vindictiveness.

Let’s see how that goes, shall we?!?

Rahab argued that from the get-go, the trial court was not too excited about him taking his case to trial:

Sir, you understand that the state is offering to do an agreed sentence of three years in prison.  The charge that you are facing now, sir, carries a potential sentence of 2 to 8.  There’s the presumption that you go to prison, okay?  And if you didn’t take the agreed sentence and you were found guilty, it would be up to the court to sentence you.  And the court does not look highly on cases where people don’t take responsibility and accept that they did something wrong if they’re found guilty.

 You understand that?  Meaning it probably would be more.  I’m not going to fool you.  You understand?

Rahab argued that the above statements amounted to a threat from the court.  The Ohio Supremes did not see it Rahab’s way.  This was not a threat said the Ohio Supremes, but rather the trial court ensuring that Rahab understood the choice he was making by going to trial.

Prior to the sentencing hearing, Rahab wrote a letter to the trial court claiming that he had wanted to admit to the crime all along and the he only went to trial because his attorney made him.  When confronted by the trial court as to why he did not just take the plea deal, Rahab answered, “I didn’t think it was worth what I did, three years.”  Below is the trial court’s response:

Eight years.  I told you when they offered you three.  So, you know, I am a little perplexed that you’re saying you didn’t think three was fair and you’re telling me that your attorney made you go to trial.  And now you are telling me that you did it.  You did it, didn’t you, right?

After admitting to committing the burglary, the trial court went on:

Okay.  So I do not understand why you wouldn’t admit to that and plead to that, and you had to have a trial, or why you wouldn’t take the three years because I can sentence you to eight.

 Makes no sense to me.  So I don’t know what you talked about with your attorney, but…too late.  You went to trial.  You gambled, you lost.  You had no defense.  And you even admit that you did it, and yet you put this woman through this trial again.

 You traumatized her by breaking into her house.  And then you had to traumatize her again to relive it and go to trial.  I don’t get it.

When Rahab’s brother addressed the trial court about Rahab’s difficult upbringing, the trial court had this to say:

He went to trial with a prove-it defense.  He had absolutely no defense.  They had his fingerprints.  He gambled, he lost.  I’m sorry, you know right from wrong, but it just does not – it’s like, yeah, now that it’s all over, oh, I’m sorry I got caught, I’m sorry I got – I went to trial and I lost.  Too late.  Too late.  To me, too late.

Sticking with its gambling theme, the trial court went on to state:

Well, guess what, you lost your gambling.  You did this.  You had no defense, and you wouldn’t take responsibility.  You wanted to go to trial.  All right, big winner you are.

The Ohio Supremes found these troubling because no court should give the appearance that it is chiding a defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial.  BUT, according to the Ohio Supremes, these statements cannot be read in isolation and they must review the entire record.

After reviewing the “entire record” the Ohio Supremes found that the trial court had a great deal of information to consider before it imposed sentence.  The Ohio Supremes went to state that it would have been better had the court’s words not hinted at a frustration with Rahab’s rejection of the plea bargain, but they still did not amount to vindictiveness.

Justice Hoover of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting for Justice Fischer, in her concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion made some noteworthy remarks.

Justice Hoover found the remarks made by the trial court prior to trial as a threat to Rahab.  Essentially, “either take the plea bargain offered by the state and forego your right to a trial or suffer a longer sentence upon a finding of guilty by the jury.”  Justice Hoover felt this remark along with the remarks at the sentencing hearing, which repeatedly mention Rahab’s rejection of the plea bargain and his decision to “gamble” and go to trial, clearly showed that the trial court acted vindictively when it sentenced Rahab.

Based on that, Justice Hoover asked the question, “If the trial court’s actions in this case do not amount to vindictiveness, then what behavior would satisfy that burden?”

Lastly, Justice Hoover found that the majority’s decision may have a chilling effect on the willingness of criminal defendants to exercise their constitutional rights to trial.

I am with Justice Hoover on this one.

Failing To File An Administrative License Suspension In A Timely Manner

In the Great State of Ohio, including the majority of the State’s in the Union, there is an Implied Consent Law in effect.  Ohio Revised Code 4511.191 provides that any person operating a motor vehicle on public or private property, shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test if arrested for Operating a Vehicle under the Influence (OVI).

A typical scenario as to when R.C. 4511.191 is where an individual is stopped by law enforcement, arrested for suspicion of OVI, and then charged for OVI.  At this point, the individual is in the back of the police cruiser thinking of all the ways he/she just screwed up.  Now, prior to asking said individual if he/she is willing to submit to a chemical test, the arresting officer must read to the arrested individual the “Advice to OVI Arrestee” on the back of the BMV 2255 Administrative License Suspension pursuant to R.C. 4511.192.

The long and short of the advice is that if a person refuses to submit to a test they are looking at a 1, 2, 3, or 5 year suspension depending on how many prior chemical test refusals the individual had in the past 6 years.  The majority of the time, the OVI charge is a first time charge for the individual and that person is looking at a 1 year license suspension for refusing the chemical test.

Now if the person decides to take the chemical test and fails the chemical test, that license suspension range is from 90 days to 3 years.  Once again, the driver’s license suspension range depends on the person’s past record over six years.  The majority of the time it is a first time failure of a chemical test bringing about a 90 day suspension.

As you can imagine, by the time a person gets to an OVI attorney, it is usually too late with what to do in regards to either taking or refusing a chemical test.  But fear not, because Ohio Law does allow an individual to appeal an Administrative License Suspension.  Let’s take a look at Toledo v. Ferguson, 2017-Ohio-1394, for some general background on Administrative License Suspensions and how one of the defenses worked to have the Administrative License Suspension vacated.

In Ferguson, Ferguson was stopped, arrested, and charged with OVI on May 7, 2016.  On May 13, 2016, six days after Ferguson’s citation, the arresting officer filed the Administrative License Suspension (ALS) BMV 225 Form.  Ferguson filed an ALS appeal on May 17, 2016, seeking the trial court to vacate the ALS on “all grounds generally, and specifically but not limited to, the violation of 4511.192.”

After the ALS hearing, the trial court denied the ALS appeal.  Soon after, Ferguson filed an appeal with the Sixth District Court of Appeals.  On appeal, Ferguson argued that because the police officer failed to comply with R.C. 4511.192.  The state, however, argued that because only factors of R.C. 4511.197(C) are to be considered for ALS appeals, noncompliance with R.C. 4511.192 does not result in Ferguson’s ALS being vacated.

R.C. 4511.197(C) provides that the scope of an appeal of an ALS for OVI is limited to determining whether one of the conditions is not met.

Below are the four conditions in R.C. 4511.197:

1)         The officer had reasonable grounds to believe offender was driving impaired;

2)        The officer requested a chemical or other test to determine impairment;

3)        The officer properly informed or notified of consequences for refusal to submit to the test; and

4)        The offender refused to submit or test results show the offender was driving impaired.

Hold on tight, I am about to dive into some more statutory analysis!

R.C. 4511.192(D)(1)(a) requires that the arresting officer shall:

Notify the person that:

1)         Their Ohio driver’s license is suspended immediately;

2)        That the suspension will last at least until the person’s initial appearance on the charge;

3)        Which will be held within five days after the date of the person’s arrest or the issuance of a citation to the person; and

4)        That the person may appeal the suspension at the initial appearance or during the period of time ending thirty days after that initial appearance.

But wait!  It gets better!

R.C. 4511.192(D)(1)(d) and (E) require the arresting officer to, within 48 hours of arrest or citation, send a sworn report to the BMV and trial court.

The above notice requirements protect the licensee’s interest in appealing the ALS at his or her initial appearance.  State v. Frame, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2498 (May 24, 1999); Meadows v. Ohio BMV, 71 Ohio Misc.2d 3.

Based on the above, the appellate court found the BMV 2255 was not filed with the court until May 13, 2016, six days after Ferguson was arrested.  This, of course, was not within the 48 hours.  Thus, the appellate court held that the arresting officer failed to comply with R.C. 4511.192 by not filing the BMV 2255 form in a timely manner.

So what does this mean for Ferguson?  Remember, The state argued that because only factors of R.C. 4511.197(C) are to be considered for ALS appeals, noncompliance with R.C. 4511.192 does not result in Ferguson’s ALS being vacated.

In an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to terminate an ALS, the licensee has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the actions of the BMV were taken in error.  State v. Williams, 2004-Ohio-2453.  For the purposes of an ALS hearing, the officer is acting as an agent of the BMV.  State v. Henry, 66 Ohio Misc.2d 57.  Thus, any action taken by the officer in error can result in the termination of an ALS.  Triguba v. Registrar, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2771 (June 27, 1996).

The state cannot set forth a statutory scheme to suspend a person’s operating privileges, not follow the scheme, and then claim that since such actions are not one of the four issues allowed in an ALS appeal a municipal or county court has no authority to terminate the ALS.  Henry.  Thus, the licensee is relieved of the burden of proving that one of the R.C. 4511.197(C) conditions had not been met where the BMV fails to present prima facie proof the officer complied with all mandates of R.C. 4511.192.  Langen v. Caltrider, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3828 (Aug. 20, 1999).

The appellate court found that the record revealed that the BMV failed to present prima facie proof of compliance with R.C. 4511.192.  Based on the noncompliance, Ferguson should have been relieved of the burden of proving that one of the R.C. 4511.197(C) conditions had not been met.  Thus, Ferguson’s ALS was vacated.

Sometimes it is in the very fine details to get that big win!

Motor Vehicles On Commercial Properties And Surrounding Curtilage

When it comes to executing warrants, the police don’t mess around.  They want to go through everything and be everywhere to find what they are looking for in a house or building.  And a catch all, if you will, on a warrant is the house or building’s surrounding curtilage.  Basically anything that is surrounding or attached to the house or building.  In State v. Nelms, 2017-Ohio-1446, the Second District Court of Appeals took a look at whether or not a motor vehicle can be curtilage if it is parked at a commercial property.

In Nelms, Dayton Police detectives completed a series of undercover buys at various locations, to include a commercial garage.  Based on their undercover buys, the detectives were able to obtain a search warrant of the commercial garage and the surrounding curtilage.

On the date of the execution of the warrant, Nelms and two other occupants pulled up to the commercial garage and went into the building.  After the Nelms and the other men went into the building, the Dayton Police detectives executed their search warrant.  During the search of the building, one of the detectives ordered the search of Nelms’ vehicle because it was on the property’s surrounding curtilage.

Nelms was arrested and indicted on one count of possession of heroin, one count of possession of cocaine, and one count of possession of marijuana.  Nelms moved to have the evidence found during the search of his vehicle suppressed, arguing that the search was beyond the scope of the warrant.  The trial court overruled Nelms’ motion and Nelms’ appealed.

Curtilage – the area immediately adjacent to a home which an individual reasonably expects is private – is regarded as part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170.  The Fourth Amendment applies to commercial premises, and extends to areas that can be equated with the curtilage of a private home.  State v. Trammel, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17196, 1999 WL 22884 (Jan. 22, 1999).  This area can include the grounds surrounding the premises, if the premises fit within the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, i.e., the area is one in which the owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id.

Surrounding curtilage is used in the warrant simply to describe the area around the building.  Id.  In search warrants, curtilage has been used to designate the area surrounding a commercial property, whether that area be a parking lot or fenced area.  Id.

Although police may be lawfully on the premises with a valid search warrant, the search is limited to those areas which may reasonably contain the items listed in the warrant.  State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301.  Any container found on the premises may be searched if it could contain the object of the search.  United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798.  Ohio appellate courts have recognized that such a warrant (authorizing the search of curtilage) extends to permit search of motor vehicles located within the curtilage of the premises.  State v. Ballez, 2010-Ohio-4720.  The assumption seems to be that a vehicle should be viewed in the same way as any other personal effects found on the described premises.  Id.

Federal circuit courts have held that a premises search warrant also covers a vehicle that appears to be owned or controlled by the premises owner.  See United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459; United States v. Patterson, 278 F.3d 315.  In cases of warrantless searches on motor vehicles there is no distinction among packages or containers based on ownership.  Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295.  If there is probable cause to search the vehicle, police may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.  Id.

Based on the above, the appellate court found that if there is probable cause to search commercial premises – which is the basis on which a warrant for the premises would issue – a vehicle found on the premises may be searched if police officers have reason to believe that the vehicle is associated with the premises.

With that, the appellate court held that Nelms’ vehicle was covered by the search warrant and upheld the trial court’s ruling.

Tough break for Nelms!  But a very interesting argument to say the least!