Recent Ohio Supreme Court Decision Broadens Ohioans’ Rights from Warrantless Police Searches

Posted on by

ohio-supreme-court-book-bag

Major Win For Ohioans, Ohio Supreme Court Rules On Protection of Privacy

On June 28, 2022 the Ohio Supreme Court released their majority opinion with an unanimous 7-0 decision, on the case of Ohio v. Burroughs. Click here to read the decision. The case involved police officers arriving at the defendant’s household to execute an arrest warrant. Soon after, Police Officers forcefully entered the household when they believed the destruction of evidence was underway. Once the defendant was arrested and detained, the police conducted a protective sweep of the premises. During this sweep an officer found a book bag and opened it to search for weapons, instead a bag of marijuana was recovered.

At trial, the prosecution was able to overcome the defense’s motion to suppress and introduce the recovered contents of the book bag into the record. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the opening of the backpack was a violation of her 4th amendment right of protection against warrantless searches. The lower courts agreed with the prosecutor’s argument that no warrant was needed under the constitution because of the single-purpose-container exception.

The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the use of the single use exception in this scenario. The single use exception has been sparingly applied where the container itself speaks for content’s inside. Meaning a police officer just by looking at the object, could conclude what’s inside of it. Some examples of this exception hypothetically could be: a gun holster, a pack of cigarettes, a tuba case. No warrants are needed in cases involving these types of items because there is no privacy to protect due to the fact the object already showed itself by the container. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the book bag that was searched, could have contained anything.

Privacy Of Book Bag Contents

This was displayed by the fact that from officer’s plain view of the book bag, he could not have reasonably determined that anything inside of the bag was illegal. So by this fact, the book bag did not meet the criteria of the single-purpose container exception. Even furthering the defense’s case the court reasoned that, a book bag, does not let someone know what is inside of a book bag just because it’s a book bag. Therefore the defendant was entitled to the protection of privacy of the contents of the book bag which could have only been overcome by a warrant.

The Ohio Supreme Court not deciding with The State is a major win for Ohioans. If the Court would have accepted their argument that the “totality of the circumstances” must be taken into account when an officer is trying to determine what’s in the bag. Then the rule, a warrant is required to search a seized item, is no longer The Rule.

Publisher’s Note:

I want to thank our new law clerk at HCM&M, Connor Zamilski, for his assistance in writing this post! Well done, Connor!

We are experienced Dayton traffic and criminal defense lawyers

Our experienced Dayton traffic and criminal defense lawyers at Holzfaster, Cecil, McKnight & Mues are here for you. We can assist you with better understanding of possible defenses to any criminal action! To learn more, please go to our website at www.hcmmlaw.com or call us at 937 293-2141. We can schedule an in-person conference or one by phone or Zoom. We look forward to helping you!

Tell Us About Your Case.

PROFANE OUTBURSTS ARE NOT BASIS FOR ADDITIONAL PRISON TIME ACCORDING TO THE OHIO SUPREME COURT

Posted on by

manson-bryant-ohio-profane outburst

Why A Ohio Trial Court Cannot Sentence Someone To More Time Based on Outbursts

In March 2019, a Lake County trial court handed down a 22-year sentence to Manson Bryant for his involvement in an armed burglary of an occupied trailer home. Bryant’s response to the sentence made national news when he uttered a variety of profanities and called the trial judge a racist. Because of Bryant’s outburst, the trial judge added six additional years to Bryant’s sentence for a total of 28 years behind bars. However, on June 7, 2022, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the trial judge could not increase Bryant’s sentence merely because of his reaction to the sentence. Click here to read the full case.

The Facts:

In October 2018, a Lake County grand jury indicted Manson Bryant for seven criminal counts relating to his involvement in the armed burglary of the occupied trailer home. Bryant pleaded not guilty to all counts and the matter proceeded to trial. Bryant was found guilty on all counts.

On March 1, 2019, some of Bryant’s counts were merged, such that Bryant was charged, and sentenced for Count One, aggravated burglary; Count Three, aggravated robbery; Count Six, having weapons while under a disability; and Count Seven, carrying concealed weapons.

At his sentencing hearing, Bryant’s attorney reminded the court that Bryant merely aided and abetted the co-defendant in the commission of the offense. Since Bryant’s co-defendant received only 12 years for the crimes, Bryant’s attorney requested that Bryant receive 10 years in prison for his participation in the crime.

Manson Bryant then addressed the court and requested leniency. He indicated that his drug addiction is the instigator of many of his poor decisions. However, Bryant told the court that he respected the jury’s decision and would respect whatever sentence the judge handed down.

After the State requested that Bryant receive a 20-year sentence, the judge handed down a sentence of 22 years. As the judge finished announcing the sentence, Bryant called the judge a variety of profanities and called the judge racist. The judge then stated that he was mistaken to believe that Bryant was remorseful for his crimes and tacked on an additional 6 years to Bryant’s sentence for a total of 28 years in prison. On March 4, 2019, approximately 3 days after Bryant’s sentencing hearing, the sentencing judgment was journalized.

Bryant’s Appeal to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals:

In his appeal to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, Manson Bryant argued that the trial court should not have added six additional years to his sentence. While Bryant acknowledged that he could have received contempt charges for his outburst, he argued that his profane outburst did not indicate that he was not remorseful for his crimes.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals relied heavily on State v. Thompson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-Ohio-1001. In Thompson, the trial court added time to a defendant’s sentence after an emotional outburst. Since the sentence had not been officially journalized, the trial court could add time to a defendant’s sentence.

Additionally, the Eleventh District noted that Bryant’s outburst merely demonstrated that his statements at his sentencing were not genuine. However, the outburst did not indicate that he was not remorseful for the crimes he helped commit. Thus, the Eleventh District affirmed Bryant’s conviction and sentence. Bryant then filed a pro se appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

The Main Issue before the Supreme Court of Ohio:

The main issue before the Supreme Court of Ohio was whether Bryant’s outburst warrants adding prison time to a defendant’s sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s Holding:

The Supreme Court determined that Bryant’s outburst did not warrant adding prison time to his sentence. While the court recognized that Bryant’s outburst was certainly disrespectful to the trial court, the court indicated that his outburst was merely a reaction to the sentence and nothing more. Since the statements did not relate to the crime committed or the victims involved, the statements could not be construed as demonstrating a lack of remorse.

Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio questioned the trial judge’s motives in sentencing Bryant for the additional six years. While the Supreme Court noted that the trial court is not required to explain their findings, such a severe addition to Bryant’s sentence should have been explained by the trial judge. Particularly, the judge should have explained why Bryant’s outburst made him believe that Bryant no longer showed remorse for his crimes.

Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted the incongruity between the trial court’s findings before and after Bryant’s outburst. Before Bryant’s profane outburst, the trial court acknowledged that Bryant exhibited remorse for his crimes. After his outburst, the trial court determined that Bryant showed no remorse. This immediate switch in the trial court’s belief of the defendant’s remorsefulness concerned the Supreme Court of Ohio. As the Supreme Court of Ohio noted, an examination of Bryant’s statements during his outburst demonstrate that he still exhibited the same level of remorsefulness.

The Supreme Court of Ohio thus determined that Bryant’s statements were merely disruptive and disrespectful. Since these kinds of statements are not sentencing factors for the trial court to consider under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the six-year increase to Bryant’s sentence was contrary to law. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed Bryant’s sentence to the originally imposed sentence of 22 years.

The Dissent:

Justice Kennedy’s dissent indicates that a defendant’s outburst, depending on the type of outburst, should be considered when determining whether a defendant is genuinely remorseful or not. When Bryant’s remorsefulness was considered, the trial court had not made its final order. Thus, the trial court had authority to modify the sentence.

Further, Justice Kennedy indicated that the Supreme Court of Ohio should not even be reviewing this case. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy cites State v. Jones. In Jones, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that an appellate court is prohibited from modifying or vacating a sentence “based on a lack of support in the record for the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Bryant, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1878 ¶ 19. Since the Supreme Court of Ohio is essentially required to evaluate the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, Justice Kennedy argued that the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled contrary to the Jones decision.

The Implications:

Overall, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent decision indicates that a defendant cannot be punished with additional prison time for a profane outburst in response to a sentence. Additionally, the holding indicates that a profane outburst cannot be considered as a lack of remorse for a crime committed. While such outbursts are certainly not encouraged and might still be grounds for a contempt charge, a trial court cannot sentence someone to more time based on these outbursts.

PUBLISHER’S NOTE: I want to thank our Summer law extern Mackenzie Reiber for writing this blog post! Well done Mack! Mackenzie is now back at the University of Dayton School of Law and will be graduating law school in May of 2023. We will all miss you!

We are experienced Dayton traffic and criminal defense lawyers

Our experienced Dayton traffic and criminal defense lawyers at Holzfaster, Cecil, McKnight & Mues are here for you. We can assist you with better understanding of possible defenses to any criminal action! To learn more, please go to our website at www.hcmmlaw.com or call us at 937 293-2141. We can schedule an in-person conference or one by phone or Zoom. We look forward to helping you!

Tell Us About Your Case.

Future of Traffic Cameras in Ohio

Posted on by

traffic cameras Home Rule Amendment

Dayton Continues To Employ Traffic Cameras Despite Ohio Supreme Court Decision

Citations generated from traffic cameras tend to be a nuisance for most drivers. However, the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent decision now makes traffic-camera citations a nuisance for local governments. On May 19, 2022, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously upheld a 2019 state law that reduces state funding to municipalities with traffic-cameras based on the revenues received from the citations. Click here to read the case.

The Facts:

On July 3, 2019, the Ohio General Assembly enacted R.C. 5747.502(B), which requires municipalities to report to the tax commissioner the fines collected from traffic cameras by July 31 of each year. Once these revenues are reported, the tax commissioner reduces a municipalities state funding based off the revenues generated from these traffic-camera citations. See. C. 5747.502(A)(6) and (C). Additionally, municipalities are required to pay for the costs and fees associated with the traffic-camera citations, unless these citations are generated from traffic violations in school zones. See .C. 4511.099(A).

Newburgh Heights is located in East Cleveland and employs traffic cameras to enforce traffic laws. After the passage of the 2019 law, Newburgh Heights filed for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Further, Newburgh Heights argued that the 2019 law violated the municipal-home-rule powers in Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution.

The Home Rule Amendment:

So what is the Home Rule Amendment? Essentially, the Home Rule Amendment grants municipalities (1) sovereignty and (2) self-sufficiency. First, the Home Rule Amendment grants municipalities full power over all matters relating to the local government. Second, this Amendment to the Ohio Constitution gives municipalities the power to levy taxes and raise revenue through other means.

The Issues Presented to the Ohio Supreme Court:

The Ohio Supreme Court was tasked with answering the two following questions:

  1. Does the Home Rule Amendment prohibit legislation that reduces a municipality’s state funding by the revenues generated from traffic-camera citations?
  2. Is a municipality required to cover the costs and fees from the civil actions commenced by the traffic cameras?

The Holding:

Regarding the first issue, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the 2019 law does not conflict with the Home Rule Amendment. The 2019 law does not outright prohibit municipalities from using traffic cameras to regulate traffic. While the 2019 law might ultimately discourage use of traffic cameras, the Court reasons that the 2019 law “may disincentivize municipalities from adopting or continuing to use traffic cameras, but it does not forbid what municipal law permits any more than the creation of a financial incentive to adopt the use of traffic cameras would require a municipality to do what its own laws proscribe.” See Newburgh Hts. v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1642 at ¶ 30. Therefore, the 2019 law does not conflict with a municipality’s sovereignty granted by the Home Rule Amendment.

As to the second issue, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a municipality’s payment of cost and fees associated with the traffic tickets does not violate the Home Rule Amendment. As the Court reasoned, the General Assembly granted municipalities jurisdiction to litigate violations of traffic laws or city ordinances. Since private litigants must pay costs and fees associated with their litigation, municipalities must also do the same. While it may be costly for the municipalities to pay these costs and fees, this provision does not violate the Home Rule Amendment because the General Assembly is not outright directing municipalities to remove their traffic cameras. Thus, this provision does not interfere with a municipality’s self-sufficiency.

The Implications:

Does the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision abolish traffic cameras? Unfortunately, that answer is no. Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion simply means that municipalities will just have to cut their losses if they want to continue to utilize traffic cameras.

However, steps are being taken by local governments to get rid of traffic cameras. For example, Columbus has completely removed traffic cameras. Cleveland has voted to remove the traffic cameras as well. On the other hand, Dayton continues to employ traffic cameras, and will for the foreseeable future. Only time will tell whether the Ohio Supreme Court’s upholding of the 2019 law will completely discourage use of traffic cameras altogether.

Our experienced Dayton traffic and criminal defense lawyers at Holzfaster, Cecil, McKnight & Mues are here for you. We can assist you with better understanding of possible defenses to any criminal action! To learn more, please go to our website at www.hcmmlaw.com or call us at 937 293-2141. We can schedule an in-person conference or one by phone or Zoom. We look forward to helping you!

PUBLISHER’S NOTE: I want to thank Mackenzie Reiber who just started externing with our firm for the Summer. Mackenzie is a second year law student at the University of Dayton School of Law. She will be graduating in May of 2023. Thanks for the great job on this blog Mackenzie!

Fleeing Misdemeanor Suspect: Warrant or no Warrant?

Posted on by

fleeing-misdemeanor-suspect

U.S. Supreme Court Overturns An Appeals Court Ruling In Case Involving Fleeing Misdemeanor Suspect

The U.S. Supreme Court on June 23, 2021, decided the case of Lange v. California that questioned whether law enforcement personal needs a warrant to enter into the home of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect. Click here to read the case.

The facts:

Arthur Lange was driving around in a station wagon playing loud music and honking his horn when an officer noticed him and activated his overhead flashing lights. Lange did not stop and continued onto his driveway and entered his garage. The state of California argued that the officer was allowed to enter into the garage of Lange without warrant because he had failed to stop when the officer’s lights were activated, which constitutes a misdemeanor offense.

The officer then followed Lange into the garage and conducted field sobriety tests. Lange was charged with the misdemeanor of driving under the influence of alcohol and a low-level noise infraction. A later blood test showed that his BAC was more than three times the legal limit.

Lange filed a motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication that was collected after an officer entered into his attached garage without a warrant. The California appeals courts applied the categorical rule that police are always entitled to enter a home without a warrant when in the hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect. However, the Supreme Court overturned the appeals court ruling and remanded the case.

Holding:

The majority opinion was written by Justice Elena Kagan, holding that under the Fourth Amendment, pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home. Justice Kagan went on to say that “A great many misdemeanor pursuits involves exigencies allowing warrantless entry. But whether a given one does so turns on the particular facts of the case.”

Implications:

  1. Case-by-case basis.

    This exclusionary rule of having to obtain a search warrant for a fleeing misdemeanor suspect is fact intensive and should apply on a case-by-case basis. Officers must now consider all the circumstances in order to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency. Some instances of good reason to enter without warrant are those “hot pursuit cases,” such as to prevent imminent harm of violence, destruction of evidence or escape from the home may justify the warrantless entry into a home.

  2. Time to spare.

    When an officer has time to get a warrant and it is not an emergency, they must obtain a warrant, even if the Defendant has fled.

  3. Fleeing felon rule intact.

    This new precedent does not, however, disturb the long-standing rule of police being allowed to enter into the home of a fleeing felon without a warrant. This was pointed out in the concurrence by Judge Kavanaugh to shine light on the differences between a fleeing misdemeanor suspect and felony suspect.

  4. Encouragement of suspects to flee.

    Justice Thomas in the concurrence stated that the exclusionary rule should not apply to evidence that is discovered by police while in pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect because it encourages suspects to flee. Further he stated that all precedents set thus far clearly disallow criminal defendants from using this exclusionary rule as a ‘shield against’ their bad conduct. Note: This however is not law, just food for thought.

Our experienced Dayton traffic and criminal defense lawyers at Holzfaster, Cecil, McKnight & Mues are here for you. We can assist you with better understanding of possible defenses to any criminal action! To learn more, please go to our website at www.hcmmlaw.com or call us at 937 293-2141. We can schedule an in-person conference or one by phone or Zoom. We look forward to helping you!

PUBLISHER’S NOTE:

I want to thank Madeline Howell for her assistance in drafting this article. Madeline has completed her first year of law school at the University of Dayton School of Law. She has been interning with Holzfaster, Cecil, McKnight & Mues for the summer. Thanks again Madeline!

Is parental discipline a defense or an element of a crime under the Ohio domestic violence and assault statutes?

Posted on by

hammer-719062_1280

On February 19, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court came out with the decision, State v. Faggs, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-523, where the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and held that reasonable parental discipline is an affirmative defense to a charge under Ohio’s domestic violence and assault statutes.

What happened in the case?

The appellant, Faggs, was charged with one third-degree-felony count of domestic violence under O.R.C. § 2919.25(A) and one first-degree misdemeanor count of assault under O.R.C. § 2903.13(A). The incident that gave rise to these charges involved the seven-year-old son of Faggs’s live-in girlfriend. Faggs allegedly beat the boy after he acted out in school.

Faggs’s attorney argued during the bench trial that the allegations were exaggerated as Faggs’s conduct was merely “a reasonable and necessary exercise of parental discipline and corporal punishment.” The court found Faggs guilty of both charges.

On appeal, Faggs argued that the trial court had violated his constitutionally protected interest in raising and controlling his child by erroneously placing the burden of proving reasonable discipline on him. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision because Faggs provided little authority as to why he should be afforded a full array of constitutional rights when he was only acting in loco parentis. The court further reasoned that “so long as the state was required to prove each element of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, treating reasonable parental discipline as an affirmative defense and placing the burden of proving that defense upon the accused does not violate due process.”

What did the Court do?

The Court was concerned with whether, under Ohio’s domestic violence and assault statutes, reasonable parental discipline is a component of the physical-harm element or whether it is an affirmative defense. Specifically, the Court was concerned with whether the state bears the burden to prove unreasonable parental discipline or if it is in the nature of an affirmative defense.

In analyzing the issue, the Court sought to clarify any confusion left by its decision in State v. Suchomski, 58 Ohio St.3d 74. In Suchomski, the Court provided an overly legalistic definition of “injury,” which resulted in confusion over who had the burden to prove the reasonableness of the discipline.

The Court applied a three-part analysis in clarifying any confusion left by Suchomski. The first part of the analysis highlighted that reasonableness is not an element of the offenses. The Court noted that its goal is to give effect to legislative intent. As such, since the legislature did not include a reasonableness requirement, but rather language to the effect of “regardless of its gravity or duration,” proof of unreasonable parental discipline is not a component of the physical-harm element.

The second part of the analysis focused on whether reasonable parental discipline is an affirmative defense. In Ohio, the two types of affirmative defenses are (1) “expressly designated,” O.R.C. § 2901.05(D)(1)(a), and (2) “involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, on which the accused can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence,” O.R.C. § 2901.05(D)(1)(b). After determining that O.R.C. § 2901.05(D)(1)(b) applied to the case at hand, the Court analyzed whether the three requirements were met. Those three requirements to qualify as an affirmative defense are (1) fit the definition of “excuse” or “justification,” (2) the justification must be “peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused,” and (3) the accused can fairly produce supporting evidence. The Court ultimately held that reasonable parental discipline met all three requirements under the statute to be considered an affirmative defense.

The third part of the analysis concerned whether the classification as an affirmative defense violated Faggs’s due process rights. The Court held that under O.R.C. § 2901.05(A), “once the state has met its burden of proof for all elements of a charged offense, the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense . . . is upon the accused.” Due to the extensive precedent suggesting that the classification comports with due process, as well as the choice of language used by the General Assembly, Faggs’s due process rights were not violated.

After considering the three parts, the Court held that reasonable parental discipline is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the accused, and the classification as an affirmative defense as well as the burden of proof are not unconstitutional.

What should you take away?

Under O.R.C. § 2901.05(A), the burden of proof concerning reasonable parental discipline lies with the accused. It is on the parent to prove a reasonable exercise of parental discipline and corporal punishment as an affirmative defense. This treatment of reasonable parental discipline as an affirmative defense does not violate the due process rights of parents to raise their children as it does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof. Click here to read the opinion.

PUBLISHERS NOTE: I want to thank Ashlyn O’Brien, a third-year law student at the University of Dayton School of Law, for all of her assistance in drafting this blog article. Excellent job Ashlyn!

Need help with a criminal defense case? Schedule an appointment online now.